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The Confusing Language of McCulloch v. 
Maryland: 
Did Marshall Really Know What He Was 
Doing (or Meant)? 
Sanford Levinson1 
All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with 
inherently indeterminate language.  I have distinguished in my 
own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and 
the Constitution of Conversation.  The former includes those 
aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of 
interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two 
senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of 
representatives, senators, and presidents.  I am quite happy to 
concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, 
though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of 
linguistics.  It is, rather, a recognition that only in the most 
unusual, perhaps even bizarre, circumstances would anyone raise 
serious questions about their meaning.  Around the seminar table, 
contemplating the highest of high theories, one can 
“problematize” all language; texts are never truly self-
interpreting.  They could, after all, be written in a secret code to 
which we must apply a key.  But, pragmatically, we all “know” 
what “two,” “four,” or “six” means, and we are even willing to 
concede without further discussion that one measures the age 
requirements for public officials against the solar rather than lunar 
calendar.  We can debate the wisdom of all of these constitutional 
1. The original version of this essay was prepared for the wonderful gathering
organized by David Schwartz that took place in November at the University of Wisconsin 
Law School in Madison.  Mark Killenbeck, the author of an indispensable book on 
McCulloch, served as a co-organizer and arranged for the publication of many of the papers 
in the Arkansas Law Review, for which I am very grateful.  Needless to say, this revised 
version benefitted from comments received at the Madison gathering, as well as from 
comments given to me by Mark Graber and Jack Balkin.  
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requirements, as I am wont to do, but there is, practically 
speaking, no serious debate about their meaning. 
This is, obviously, in contrast with the parts of the 
Constitution that the legal academy actually chooses to teach (and 
obsess) about.  Our students are not introduced to the Constitution 
via the Veto Clause and its requirement for two-thirds of each 
House to join in an override, or Article V’s requirement that three-
quarters of the states agree to ratify a given constitutional 
amendment.  A few of us may denounce both as giving way too 
much power to entrenched minorities—and thus exemplifying 
what I have criticized as “our undemocratic Constitution.”2 Or, if 
we are devotees of Bruce Ackerman (as I am), we might note the 
way that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is in some 
tension with the assumptions underlying Article V regarding the 
freedom that the states might be thought to have to reject a 
proffered proposal.3  Still, I am confident that most of us spend 
almost all of our professional time, especially in the classroom, 
with materials that generate genuine controversies about 
constitutional meaning as measured by the frequency with which 
they are litigated.  Interpretive approaches to the “majestic 
generalities”4 of the Fourteenth Amendment take precedence over 
any serious discussion of the actual provenance of the 
Amendment in terms of the ostensible requirements of Article V.5 
What I want to do in this essay is to explore one such 
interpretive controversy, which involves one of the truly key 
words in the entire theological and political lexicon ”— 
“sovereignty.”6  I increasingly realize that my entire introductory 
course in constitutional law could be described as an extended 
meditation on the term.  And it is no coincidence at all that in 
2018-19, I taught both a reading course at Harvard during the fall 
semester and then a full-scale seminar at the University of Texas 
2. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
3. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 111 (2000).
4. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947).
5. But see PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
348-51 (7t ed. 2018), which, as in previous editions, does at least acknowledge the presence 
of the Ackermanian question about the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment as an 
Article V amendment. 
6. On the theological importance of “sovereignty,” see generally JEAN BETHKE
ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF (2008). 
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Law School in the spring on the many controversies generated by 
taking seriously the notion of “popular sovereignty” (especially 
when combined with the prospect of Wilsonian “self-
determination”).  No idea has been more important—or, possibly, 
generated more mischief—over the past three centuries.7 
Given our general topic, and my own obsession with the 
case, I shall, of course, be especially addressing McCulloch.8  But 
it is crucial to begin with one prior case, which is left totally 
unmentioned by John Marshall; indeed, he cites no cases 
whatsoever in what can only be described as his truly monumental 
“state paper” on the American constitutional order that goes well 
beyond deciding the case at hand.9  Ignoring precedent is certainly 
understandable in “cases of first impression,” where, by 
definition, there are no relevant cases to draw on as potentially 
authoritative.  But, to put it mildly, the status of states as 
“sovereign” was scarcely unexamined by 1819.  It was the central 
issue of the first important case decided in 1793 by the United 
States Supreme Court, Chisholm v. Georgia.10  Unfortunately, it 
has basically dropped out, assuming it was ever part of, the 
pedagogical canon of constitutional law; perhaps because of our 
tendency in the legal academy to treat John Marshall as if he were 
the first (instead of the fourth) Chief Justice and therefore to 
ignore anything the Court did prior to his arrival.  This is a 
fundamental error. 
Anyone who takes seriously the notion of “sovereignty”—
and the role the term plays in American political and legal 
discourse——must confront Chisholm.  I would say, incidentally, 
that this is especially true for ostensible originalists, who should 
explain how it is that the 1793 Court—which included among its 
members by all accounts one of the three most important 
members first of the Philadelphia Convention and then the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson, as well as one 
of the three authors of The Federalist, Chief Justice John Jay—
7.  See Sanford Levinson, The Continuing Specter of Popular Sovereignty and National
Self-Determination in an Age of Political Uncertainty, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN 
CRISIS? 651 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018). 
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
9. See id. 
10. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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could have been so mistaken about the original public meaning of 
what appears to the naïve as the plain text of the Constitution. 
In any event, Chisholm involved the desire of the executor 
of an estate in South Carolina to sue Georgia in federal court for 
a debt clearly owed by the state with regard to purchases during 
the Revolutionary War (or, as I prefer to call it, the Secession 
from the British Empire).11  The state claimed “sovereign 
immunity” from even having to answer the claim filed against it.12  
The Court then ruled by a vote of four to one, with James Iredell 
of North Carolina writing in splendid isolation, that Georgia had 
no such immunity.13  Two of the opinions, by Justices Blair and 
Cushing, rested on what we would today call “textual argument.”  
Thus Cushing writes as follows: 
The judicial power . . . is expressly extended to 
“controversies between a State and citizens of another 
State.” . . . . The case, then, seems clearly to fall within the 
letter of the Constitution. It may be suggested that it could 
not be intended to subject a State to be a Defendant, because 
it would effect the sovereignty of States. If that be the case, 
what shall we do with the immediate preceding clause; 
“controversies between two or more States,” where a State 
must of necessity be Defendant? If it was not the intent, in 
the very next clause also, that a State might be made 
Defendant, why was it so expressed as naturally to lead to 
and comprehend that idea? Why was not an exception made, 
if one was intended?14 
For anyone who professes to take text seriously—think, for 
example, of the late Justice Scalia or the present Justice 
Gorsuch—this would seem to be as close to a knock-down 
argument as is imaginable.  As textualists, including myself in my 
“Constitution of Settlement” mode, are prone to ask, “what part 
of ‘controversies between a State and citizens of another State’ do 
you not understand?”  But, as Justice Iredell, himself no second-
rate intellect, suggested, states might claim to stand in the shoes 
11. Id. at 420. 
12. Id. at 419. 
13. Id. at 420. 
14. Id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
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of the British Monarch, who certainly enjoyed sovereign 
immunity.15  Moreover, one can even point to various statements 
made by proponents of the Constitution, trying to wrest the votes 
of wavering delegates justifiably concerned that the new 
Constitution created a “consolidated government” that left states 
as pitiful hulks of their formerly sovereign selves at the time of 
the 1776 secession from the Empire or even prior to ratification 
of the new Constitution.16 
So it is necessary (and proper) to turn to the truly remarkable 
opinions of the first Chief Justice, John Jay, and then, perhaps 
even more notably, of James Wilson, who in addition to his 
practical importance at two conventions in Philadelphia, also 
wrote the first great American treatise on law.17  I shall quote at 
length from these opinions, in part reflecting my increasing 
frustration by the actual paucity of time spent analyzing given 
cases—including, importantly, McCulloch—even as we profess 
to take cases seriously.  But to take cases truly seriously requires 
devotion of due time to their complexity, not to focus simply on 
favorite paragraphs that turn out to be the equivalent of 
soundbites.  And it may well be that spending such time is far 
more likely to reveal the inherent complexities and even 
contradictions within a given opinion than to provide a confident 
“rationale” that hapless students can write down in a brief of the 
case.  I usually tell my students that briefing cases is a waste of 
time; or, to put it another way, if McCulloch could truly be 
“briefed,” then why in the world should it be included in its 
entirety, as it is, in the casebook that I co-edit or even the 
relatively lengthy excerpts that are found in most casebooks?  
There is a reason that I have devoted a twelve-hour reading course 
at Harvard and the first half of the semester in a course at the 
University of Texas to reading aloud Marshall’s opinion in its 
entirety and stopping to discuss the important questions (often 
begged) that can be found within almost literally every sentence.  
15. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
16. 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 553 (Barbara B. Oberg et al. eds., 2003)
(text of Kentucky Resolutions drafted anonymously by Jefferson). 
17. Wilson’s lectures on law, together with other of his important writings, are
available in a well-produced, affordable two-volume edition published by the Liberty Fund, 
edited by the late Kermit Hall, JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2007). 
12 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:1 
The same could be done with Chisholm, and indeed practically 
any of the truly significant cases within the canon. 
“In determining the sense in which Georgia is a sovereign 
State,” Jay writes, we must advert back “to the political situation 
we were in . . . prior to the Revolution.”18  No doubt at that time, 
“[a]ll the people of this country were then, subjects of the King of 
Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil 
authority then existing or exercised here, flowed from the head of 
the British Empire,” as sovereign.19  Indeed, at least through the 
fateful execution of King Charles in 1649, monarchs claimed to 
have derived their own sovereignty from Divine sovereignty.20  
Recall, in this context, Romans 13:1 and its proclamation that 
magistrates are chosen by God and are, presumably, entitled to 
the deference the faithful grant to the Ruler of the Universe.21  
Divine Right theories did not survive the Seventeenth Century, of 
course.  Not only did Cromwellites execute King Charles I in 
1649; the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which sent James II into 
exile and replaced him, by Parliamentary choice, with William 
and Mary of the Netherlands, made it clear that the basis of 
monarchical legitimacy was now rooted in some theory, however 
evanescent, of popular (or at least parliamentary) acceptance.22  
What replaced monarchical sovereignty, save for ceremonial 
references to the monarch as “sovereign,” was the sovereignty of 
the British parliament.23  That was, however, scarcely acceptable 
to the American secessionists, who were almost pathetically 
critical of King George III for his failure to veto what the colonists 
claimed were overreaching laws passed by the Parliament.24  
18. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
19. Id. 
20. See generally J. NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE THEORY OF THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS
(2d ed. 1922). 
21. As stated in the King James Version well known to English Protestants, “Let every
soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be 
are ordained of God.”  Romans 13:1 (King James). 
22. See G. Edward White, 1 LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE 
COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 115 (2012) (Glorious Revolution 
“established the House of Common in Parliament as the principal law making body. . .  The 
theory of sovereignty animating the arrangement was that although formal sovereignty 
remained vested in the monarch for some purposes, primary practical sovereignty, in the 
form of lawmaking power, resided in Parliament.”).   
23. Id. 
24. See ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING 64-65 (2014). 
2019 THE CONFUSING LANGUAGE 13 
They did not truly assimilate the reality that the royal veto power 
had been, as a practical matter, eliminated, last exercised by 
Queen Anne in 1709 and to disappear thereafter.25  And no one 
should believe that the colonists desired token representation, 
even by elected representatives, in a Parliament that would 
continue to view itself as possessing the power to pass whatever 
tax legislation it wished to apply to America.26  What they wanted 
was independence from the tentacles of parliamentary 
sovereignty, not token participation in its decisionmaking.27 
According to Jay, the Declaration “found the people already 
united for general purposes.”28  This is, after all, what allowed the 
Declaration to open with the altogether debatable assertion that 
the colonists were “one people” asserting their right to leave the 
Empire.  Jay had also asserted this proposition as one of the co-
authors of The Federalist advocating replacement of the Articles 
of Confederation by the Constitution.29  “From the crown of Great 
Britain, the sovereignty of their country,” that is, the United 
States, or in some texts, the “united States,” “passed to the people 
of it.”30  It should be noted, there is nothing innocent in the use of 
“it” rather than “them.”  Jay anticipated the all-important change, 
following the carnage of 1861-65, from referring to the “United 
States” in the plural to instead adopting the singular.  Jay’s is a 
precursor of the most nationalist version of Marshall’s later 
opinion by asserting that “the people . . .. . . continued to consider 
themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they 
continued without interruption to manage their national concerns 
accordingly.”31  They manifested this by making “a confederation 
of the States, the basis of a general government.”32 However, 
“[e]xperience disappointed the expectations they had formed 
from it.”33  Several of the Framers, including Randolph and 
Hamilton, denounced the Confederation government as 
25. Id. at 16; F.P. LOCK, EDMUND BURKE, VOLUME II: 1784-1797 67 (1998).
26. Nelson, supra note 24, at 37.
27. See id. at 109. 
28. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
29. See SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE
FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 12-17 (2015) (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 in which 
John Jay enunciated the theme that Americans were “one people”). 
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“imbecilic,”34 the rectification of which licensed the 
extraordinary freedom displayed by the Convention with regard 
to the seeming constraints imposed either by the Congressional 
authorization for the Convention in the first place or, even more 
dramatically, by the rigid rules of amendment presented by 
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation.  In any event, Jay 
tells us, “the people, in their collective and national capacity, 
established the present Constitution.”35 
It is at this point that we reach what might be termed the 
“money paragraph” in Jay’s opinion: 
It is remarkable that in establishing it, the people exercised 
their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and 
conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming 
dignity, “We the people of the United States, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution.” Here we see the people acting as 
sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of 
sovereignty, establishing a Constitution by which it was their 
will, that the State Governments should be bound, and to 
which the State Constitutions should be made to conform. 
Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between 
the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain 
manner; and the Constitution of the United States is likewise 
a compact made by the people of the United States to govern 
themselves as to general objects in a certain manner. By this 
great compact however, many prerogatives were transferred 
to the national Government, such as those of making war and 
peace, contracting alliances, coining money, etc. etc.36 
Could John Marshall possibly have put it any better?  (That 
he did not, as a matter of fact, is a primary topic of this paper.) 
What we might even wish to describe as American 
exceptionalism pervades Jay’s opinion inasmuch as he offers 
America as a vivid contrast to the “feudal principles” that 
continue to animate “the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly 
in England.”37  There the Prince is considered “as the sovereign, 
and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object 
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).
35. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
36. Id. at 470-71.
37. Id. 
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of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal 
footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere.”38  
It therefore easily follows that “such a sovereign could not be 
amenable to a Court of Justice, or subjected to judicial controul 
and actual constraint.”39  There is a further problem, of course, 
which is that the monarch possesses “all the Executive powers,” 
so that “the judgment of the Courts would, in fact, be only 
monitory, not mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is 
a distinct thing from a capacity to be sued.”40  However, Jay 
assures us, “No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the 
sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the 
sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without 
subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be so called) 
and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America 
are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the 
sovereignty.”41 
What is “sovereignty”?  It is, says Jay, “the right to 
govern.”42  More accurately, perhaps, for Americans it is the right 
to establish the terms of governance even as representatives 
engage in the actual quotidian acts of governance.  In Europe, 
where “princes” are sovereign, “the sovereign actually 
administers the Government; here [in America], never in a single 
instance.”43  Instead, “our Governors are the agents of the 
people,” “who are the actual sovereigns.44  As Richard Tuck 
argues in his important book The Sleeping Sovereign, Jay fully 
adopts an all-important distinction between sovereignty and 
government.45  It is the people who establish the government, 
which may or may not have limited powers.46  Hobbes powerfully 
argued that a sovereign people would in fact choose to adopt what 
most of us would describe as a tyrannical Leviathan state as the 
sole way of escaping the otherwise “nasty, brutish, and short” life 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).




45. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF
MODERN DEMOCRACY (2015). 
46. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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presented in an insufficiently governed natural state.47  It may be 
that such a government possesses, as a practical matter, the 
powers that we associate with “sovereignty.”  But as an analytical 
matter, we should continue to distinguish between the “real 
sovereign,” even if (s)he should be sleeping, and the government 
that is created by the sovereign.  After all, at least under some 
circumstances, it is possible that the sleeping sovereign might 
arise from bed and invoke all of the necessarily retained powers 
of sovereignty set out, for example, in the Declaration of 
Independence. 
What this all adds up to is the clear liability of a state within 
the Union to be sued by a citizen of another state inasmuch as no 
government can claim itself to be “sovereign.”  The clear text 
rests on a profound political theory, which indeed distinguishes 
the New Order being established by Americans from the “feudal” 
one being left blessedly behind.  Jay offers the equivalent of a 
syllogism: 
It is agreed, that one free citizen may sue another; the 
obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of society 
demanding it.  It is agreed, that one free citizen may sue any 
number on whom process can be conveniently executed; 
nay, in certain cases one citizen may sue forty thousand; for 
where a corporation is sued, all the members of it are actually 
sued, though not personally, sued. 
The state is simply a peculiar kind of corporation, and no less 
amenable to suit simply because it is called Georgia.  Like 
Cushing, he notes that “one State may sue another State in this 
Court”48 without fatal insult to what Justice Kennedy would much 
later dubiously insist is the “dignity” instantiated in being a State 
within the Union.49  So, Jay quite cleverly suggests that “[i]t is 
not therefore to an appearance in this Court that the objection 
points.”50  Instead, Georgia claims to be insulted by the lese 
47. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115 (Lerner Publ’g Grp. 2018) (1651).
48. Id. at 473. 
49. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
50. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 473 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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majeste of being sued by a South Carolina citizen.51  That would 
be tenable if Georgia had, as Iredell seems to suggest, succeeded 
to the status of George III.52  But it did not.  As Gerald Ford would 
put it in 1974, “Here the [P]eople rule,”53 which means that states 
can be sued as well as sue one another (and, just as importantly, 
act as plaintiffs against individual citizens).  To rule otherwise 
would contradict and do violence to the great and leading 
principles of a free and equal national government, one of 
the great objects of which is, to ensure justice to all:—[t]o 
the few against the many, as well as to the many against the 
few. It would be strange, indeed, that the joint and equal 
sovereigns of this country, should, in the very Constitution 
by which they professed to establish justice, so far deviate 
from the plain path of equality and impartiality, as to give to 
the collective citizens of one State, a right of suing individual 
citizens of another State, and yet deny to those citizens a 
right of suing them.54 
Jay concludes his opinion with a tantalizing observation and 
question:  Does his argument extend to the ability of a citizen to 
sue the United States itself?55  He concedes that it is “fair 
reasoning” from his overall argument that that should be the 
case.56  However, he explains that “the same principles of candour 
which urge [him] to mention this objection also urge [him] to 
suggest an important difference between the two cases.”57  The 
brute fact is that although federal courts might be expected to be 
supported by the national executive with regard to judgments 
against states, no same expectation can necessarily be enjoyed 
with regard to “cases of actions against . . . the United States; . . . 
[because] there is no power which the Courts can call to their aid. 
From this distinction important conclusions are deducible, and 
51. Id. (“It is not therefore to an appearance in this Court that the objection points.  To
what does it point?  It points to an appearance at the suit of one or more citizens.”). 
52. Id. at 446 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
53. President Gerald R. Ford, Remarks at Swearing in Ceremony at The White House 
(Aug. 9, 1974) (transcript available in the Ford Library Museum), 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740001.asp. 
54. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 477 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
55. See id. 
56. Id. at 478. 
57. Id. 
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they place the case of a State, and the case of the United States, 
in very different points of view.”58 
Perhaps one might regard this cautionary note as Bickelian 
prudentialism avant la lettre.59  After all, the concern about what 
might be termed an “unsympathetic executive” might be said to 
be the fundamental concern that will explain Marbury v. 
Madison60 only a decade later, when the “passive virtues” of what 
many have perceived as Marshall’s capitulation to political reality 
and Jeffersonian power predominated to prevent William 
Marbury from receiving the commission to which Marshall 
clearly believed he was legally entitled.61  Perhaps in the future, 
Jay suggests, “the State of society [will be] so far improved, and 
the science of Government advanced to such a degree of 
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceable course 
of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual 
citizens.”62  But in 1793 that is simply a dream.  That the United 
States itself may be able to escape its just legal deserts does not, 
however, compel a similar conclusion with regard to Georgia. 
Should we not already be convinced, James Wilson certainly 
provides added reinforcement, especially rhetorically.  He 
describes the case as being one “of uncommon magnitude” owing 
to the fact that “[o]ne of the parties to it is a State:—certainly 
respectable, claiming to be sovereign.”63  But a “claim” is not the 
equivalent of the fact asserted, and Wilson devotes his opinion to 
demolishing it.64 
He begins by noting that “[t]o the Constitution of the United 
States, the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown . . . . They 
might have announced themselves ‘“SOVEREIGN’” people of 
the United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided 
the ostentatious declaration.”65  One might wonder why that 
58. Id. 
59. See Alexander Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 
(1961) (explaining the techniques by which the United States Supreme Court avoids deciding 
certain especially politically troublesome constitutional issues in order to preserve its own 
institutional power).  
60. See generally 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
61. Bickel, supra note 59, at 49-51.
62. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 478 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
63. Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
64. See id. at 453-66. 
65. Id. at 454. 
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would be “ostentatious,”66 as distinguished from saying simply 
that it was totally unnecessary given the opening of the Preamble.  
In any case, for Wilson, the state should “be considered as 
subordinate to the People . . . . The only reason, I believe, why a 
free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself.”67 
Randy Barnett, one of the relatively few other analysts who 
has paid such careful attention to Wilson’s opinion, uses this as 
the basis for what I regard as a near-anarchic doctrine of 
individual sovereignty.68  But, at the very least, we might agree 
that Wilson’s theory of popular sovereignty makes untenable any 
theory of state sovereignty, whether in reference to Georgia or, 
indeed, to the United States. Contrary to what Justice Kennedy 
will later assert, “dignity” is possessed by free individuals, not by 
artificial states.69  Thus, Wilson writes, “[i]f the dignity of each 
singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be 
unimpaired. A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A 
dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant, willfully refuses to 
discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice: Upon 
general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to 
answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, 
to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by 
declaring ‘I am a Sovereign state?’ Surely not.”70  There may be 
a prudential, “realist” response to Wilson, but is there a truly 
principled one? 
“In one sense,” writes Wilson, “the term ‘sovereign’ has for 
its correlative, ‘subject. . .’” just as, we often argue today, “rights” 
imply “duties.”71  But, he insists that this sense of “sovereignty” 
66. Id. 
67. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455-56 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
68. Randy Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576, 2597-
99 (2014). 
69.  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455-56 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“By a State I mean, a complete
body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is 
their own, and to do justice to others.  It is an artificial person.  It has its affairs and its 
interests . . . its rights . . . its obligations.  It may acquire property distinct from that of its 
members . . . incur debts to be discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private 
fortunes of individuals.  It may be bound by contracts; [and] for damages arising from the 
breach of those contracts.  In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and 
artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those, who think and speak, 
and act, are men.”). 
70. Id. at 456.
71. Id. 
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“can receive no application” in the United States” for “[u]nder 
th[e] Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects.”72  What 
about states?  Does that make a difference?  “[S]ome writers” 
assert that “every State, which governs itself without any 
dependence on another power, is a sovereign State.”73  However, 
Wilson is truly committed to the constitutional guarantee, in the 
constitutional text, that each State possess a Republican Form of 
Government.74  So what does that mean? 
[M]y short definition of such a Government is,—one
constructed on this principle, —that the Supreme Power
resides in the body of the people. As a Judge of this Court, I
know, and can decide upon the knowledge, that the citizens
of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the
Union, as a part of the “People of the United States,” did not
surrender the Supreme or sovereign Power to that State; but,
as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As
to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a
sovereign State. If the Judicial decision of this case forms
one of those purposes; the allegation, that Georgia is a
sovereign State, is unsupported by the fact.75
Wilson goes on to cite the plain words of Article III, as well 
as the purposes of the Constitution set out in the Preamble, and 
demonstrates that both parts of the Constitution support rejecting 
any claim of sovereign immunity by Georgia.76 
As is well known, the Eleventh Amendment overruled 
Chisolm.77  But, as John Manning has well argued, the language 
of that Amendment is remarkably limited to the specifics of the 
case itself, i.e., the suit by an out-of-state citizen against a state.78  
It in no way adopts any general declaration (or even presumption) 
72. Id. 
73. RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN
CONTEXT 84 (3d ed. 2018). 
74. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 457 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 474-75.
77.  See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1667 
(2004).  
78. See Manning, supra note 77, at 1680–83. 
2019 THE CONFUSING LANGUAGE 21 
of state sovereignty.79  We are also invited to ask whether the 
Amendment overruled a clearly incorrect decision, as appears to 
be believed by the current majority of the Supreme Court,80 or 
instead, changed the meaning of the Constitution itself by 
overriding what was clearly a correct reading of the 1787 
Constitution.81  As you might suspect, I would argue that the latter 
is clearly the case.  Or, let me put it this way:  If Georgia is a 
sovereign state in any truly serious sense, then we should 
recognize, among other things, the potential legitimacy of its 
secession, on behalf of the “one people” of Georgia, from the 
Union in 1861, just as the “one people” of the United States 
seceded from the British Empire in 1776.  “Sovereignty” is not a 
term that should be bandied about as if its meaning can be easily 
cabined. 
So, at long last we turn to the object of our gathering, what I 
believe is the single most important, and perhaps mysterious, 
opinion in our entire canon:  McCulloch v. Maryland.82  I begin, 
as is doubly appropriate, with the very first sentence, which 
begins “In this case now to be determined, [Maryland], a 
sovereign State . . . .”83  I have for many years been perplexed 
why Marshall, an unusually skilled rhetorician, chose to begin the 
opinion this way.  After all, if one takes a traditional view of what 
sovereignty entails—i.e., the power of ruling and not being ruled 
in return84—then the obvious message of the case, particularly its 
second part, dealing with the power to tax the Bank of the United 
States, is that Maryland in no serious sense is a “sovereign state” 
(just as so-called “Kentucky colonels” like Harlan Sanders are in 
fact not “colonels” in the U.S. military).  It may be the case that 
Maryland was once a sovereign state, upon, say, gaining 
independence via the Treaty of Paris in 1783 that recognized the 
existence of the thirteen independent American states.  We do 
continue to call former office-holders by their title, so that at 
present there are Presidents Carter, Clinton, Bush, and Obama in 
addition to President Donald J. Trump.  But, for better or worse, 
79. See id. at 1682–83. 
80. See id. at 1728 n.246.
81. See id. at 1739–41. 
82. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
83. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).  I will generally place any reference to “sovereign”
or “sovereignty” in boldface. 
84. See Sovereignty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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only the last in this series can exercise any of the Article II powers 
assigned to presidents or other powers delegated by Congress.  
The other former presidents know not to confuse the honorific use 
of a former title with an acknowledgment of even an iota of legal 
power.  So was Marshall simply using the term “sovereign” with 
regard to Maryland as an honorofic reminder of past glory but not 
otherwise to be taken as indicative of any genuine legal power? 
One might well view the power to tax (like the power to 
wage war) as the sine qua non of sovereignty.  Not insignificantly, 
after all, it was the King’s alleged power to tax in the absence of 
parliamentary acquiescence that triggered the English Revolution 
in 1642 and the similar allegation of British parliamentary power 
to levy stamp and tea taxes, among others, on the colonists in 
America that triggered the secession and creation of the United 
States of America.85  Any look at McCulloch reveals that 
Maryland has no power to wage war or, importantly, even to enter 
into treaties with foreign countries, and the case stands for the 
proposition that the power to tax is limited as well.86  This is 
obvious from a simple reading of the text, especially Article I, 
Section 10, concerning  the possibility of imposing tariffs or 
inspections fees.  But it is either Marshall’s genius or audacity to 
imply a further prohibition on the taxing power of the purportedly 
“sovereign” state, drawn not from the text of the Constitution, but 
instead from what he identifies as the “texture” of the document.87  
In fact, as Marshall is well aware, Federalist 32 contains a long 
discussion of the concurrent powers of both the states and the 
national government to engage in taxation, with the concomitant 
suggestion that the inevitable clashes that would arise would be 
settled politically and, most definitely, not by reference to 
ostensibly legalistic constraints contained in the Constitution.88  
Marshall essentially declares that the Federalist is irrelevant.89  
Again, one can wonder about the actual reality of “originalism” 
in explaining American constitutional development. 
85. See, e.g., Christopher Hibbert, CAVALIERS AND ROUNDHEADS: THE 
ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 1642-1649 (1994). 
86. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316.
87. Id. at 426.
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
89. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 433–35. 
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Moreover, the absence of any reference to Chisholm is 
especially perplexing.  Is it sufficient to say either that it was 
decided a full quarter century prior to the 1819 decision 
considering the Bank (and Maryland’s attempt to tax it)?  Or is 
Marshall implicitly interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, which 
is never mentioned in the slightest, given its utter formal 
irrelevance to the case, as fundamentally overruling the opinions 
of both Jay and Wilson and not merely the particular holding that 
a state can be sued by a citizen of another state?  But why would 
he do that? 
It was suggested in the Madison gathering that the first 
sentence might have been written as it was in order to assure the 
vote of a possibly recalcitrant colleague.  There is no evidence for 
this.  More to the point, it would be quite stunning if any member 
of the Court genuinely doubted the constitutionality of the Bank, 
given that Madison himself had signed the renewal in 1816.  And, 
as already suggested, the important declaration in Part II, that 
Maryland’s tax was unconstitutional, is at complete odds with the 
description of the State as “sovereign.”90  A justice who 
demanded the inclusion of the adjective in sentence one would be 
hard-pressed to explain acquiescence to the way that Marshall 
almost eviscerates the ostensible concession in the course of the 
opinion. 
Not surprisingly, the next string of appearances of the term 
occurs in paragraphs 7-11, which deal with what might be called 
the ontology of the Union.  That is, what is the basis of the Union?  
How was it created?  We get one distinct creation story in both 
Jay’s and Wilson’s opinions.  By 1798, Madison and Jefferson, 
although authors of the Declaration of Independence, have 
offered, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, respectively,  
very different creation myths in which state sovereignty can 
indeed be thought to be central.91  And, for that matter, one can 
90. See supra text accompanying note 89.
91.  For the texts of these seminal documents see, 
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/primary-source-documents/virginia-
and-kentucky-resolutions/.  For a brilliant analysis of some of the crucial differences between 
Madison and Jefferson, particularly with regard to the notion of “nullification,” see Jonathan 
Gienapp, How to Maintain a Constitution:  The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and 
James Madison’s Struggle with the Problem of Constitutional Maintenance, in SANFORD 
LEVINSON, ED., NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 53 (2016).  
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see precursors of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in 
Federalist 39, where Publius (Madison) is attempting to square 
the circle of describing the nature of the American republic.92  Not 
surprisingly, Marshall notes that: 
the counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of some 
importance, in the construction of the constitution, to 
consider that instrument not as emanating from the people, 
but as the act of sovereign and independent States. The 
powers of the general government, it has been said, are 
delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and 
must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone 
possess supreme dominion.93 
The gauntlet clearly being thrown down by the (sovereign?) 
State of Maryland, Marshall immediately indicates that “[i]t 
would be difficult to sustain this proposition.”94  Whatever role 
the States might have played in selecting the delegates who 
attended the Philadelphia Convention is now irrelevant.95  After 
all, “the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere 
proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it.”96  They had no 
authority to “adopt” the Constitution; in no way did the 
Convention view itself as what would come to be called a 
“constituent power.”97  Instead, and crucially, the 
recommendation adopted on September 17, 1787, “was reported 
to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a request 
that it might ‘be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen 
in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of 
its Legislature, for their assent and ratification.’”98  For Marshall, 
this is equivalent to submitting the text “to the people,” the 
presumptive sovereigns.99  He then dances around the issue of 
whether they were “the people” of the entire United States, as 
insisted upon by Jay especially, or “the people” of their particular 
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).
93. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 403.
95. See id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403.
99. Id. 
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states, who retained that identity throughout.100  “It is true,” 
Marshall admits, that “they assembled in their several States—
and where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer 
was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which 
separate the States, and of compounding the American people into 
one common mass.”101  Of course one might suggest that Jay and 
Wilson were precisely such “dreamers,” at least conceptually, for 
what else can “one people” mean if not some version of a 
“common mass.”  However, Marshall writes, and the key question 
is whether this is a fundamental concession or something else, 
“Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the 
measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the 
measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of 
the State governments.”102 
 It is “[f]rom these Conventions” that “the constitution 
derives its whole authority.  The government proceeds directly 
from the people,” who have the capacity to “‘‘ordain[] and 
establish[]’” a new political order “in the name of the people.”103  
Although “[t]he assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity,” 
might have been inferred through their ability to call a 
Convention, and even agreeing to submit the proposed 
Constitution “to the people,” Marshall emphasizes that “the 
people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act 
was final.  It required not the affirmance, and could not be 
negatived, by the State governments. The constitution, when thus 
adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State 
sovereignties.”104  At the moment they were “bound,” it seems 
fair to suggest, they were no longer sovereign in any truly 
meaningful sense.  They might have possessed certain retained 
powers, of course, but those were the result of recognition by what 
might be termed the “true sovereign,” i.e., the people who 
“ordained and established” the Constitution that created the new 
national government and announced formal supremacy over the 
formerly sovereign state governments.  From this perspective, 
there is one sovereign—”We the People”—and two levels of 
100. Id. at 403-05. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403.
104. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
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government who have only such powers either assigned or 
recognized by the sovereign people. 
“It has been said,” Marshall writes, and, of course, one 
wonders about who exactly has said this, “that the people had 
already surrendered all their powers to the State sovereignties, 
and had nothing more to give.”105“  He is not impressed. 
But, surely, the question whether they may resume and 
modify the powers granted to government does not remain 
to be settled in this country. Much more might the legitimacy 
of the general government be doubted, had it been created by 
the States. The powers delegated to the State sovereignties 
were to be exercised by themselves, not by a distinct and 
independent sovereignty, created by themselves. To the 
formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the 
State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, “in 
order to form a more perfect union,” it was deemed 
necessary to change this alliance into an effective 
government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and 
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to 
the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, 
was felt and acknowledged by all.  The government of the 
Union, then . . . is emphatically, and truly, a government of 
the people.  In form and in substance, it emanates from them.  
Its powers are granted by them . . . . It is the government of 
all; its powers are delegated by all.106 
Although one hesitates to describe this paragraph as a model 
of clarity, it does appear that the constituent power is placed in a 
collective (and ontologically singular) people who create the 
“constituted powers” that are placed in both national and state 
governments.  For better or, I believe, for worse, Marshall is not 
done with his display of what might be called “sovereignty talk.”  
The further instances are as follows: 
. . . [T]he power of creating a corporation, is one 
appertaining to sovereignty, and is not expressly conferred 
on Congress. This is true. But all legislative powers 
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
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appertain to sovereignty . . . . The creation of a corporation, 
it is said, appertains to sovereignty.  This is admitted.  But 
to what portion of sovereignty does it appertain. . .? In 
America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the 
government of the Union, and those of the States.  They are 
each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, 
and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed 
to the other . . . . [H]ad the people conferred on the general 
government the power contained in the constitution, and on 
the States the whole residuum of power, would it have been 
asserted, that the government of the Union was not 
sovereign, with respect to those objects which were 
entrusted to it . . . ?  If this could not have been asserted, we 
cannot well comprehend the process of reasoning which 
maintains, that a power appertaining to sovereignty cannot 
be connected with that vast portion of it which is granted to 
the general government . . .107  The good sense of the public 
has pronounced, without hesitation, that the power of 
punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised 
whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidentally to 
his constitutional powers.  It is a means for carrying into 
execution all sovereign powers. . ..108 
That the power of taxing [the bank] by the States may be 
exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied.  But 
taxation is said to be an absolute power, which acknowledges 
no other limits than those expressly prescribed in the 
constitution, and like sovereign power of every other 
description, is intrusted to the discretion of those who use it.  
But the very terms of this argument admit, that the 
sovereignty of the State, in the article of taxation itself, is 
subordinate to, and may be controlled by the constitution of 
the United States.109 
If we measure the power of taxation residing in a State, by 
the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single state 
possess, and can confer on its government, we have an 
intelligible standard, applicable to every case to which the 
107. Id. at 409-11 (emphasis added).
108. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
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power may be applied . . . . We are relieved, as we ought to 
be, from clashing sovereignty . . . .110 
So it is at this point that I can ask the question that genuinely 
mystifies me:  What, if anything, is gained by the use of the term 
“sovereignty” in the paragraphs immediately above, that would 
not be present if instead we simply used the word “government” 
perhaps accompanied by the adjective “effective” or, to use a fine 
18th-century term, “efficacious”?  As Marshall himself insists, 
one should read the Constitution to provide for just such a 
government, given the dismal experience under the Articles of 
Confederation.111  One can even read the Constitution, should one 
wish, to provide for certain protections for the sub-national 
governments whose functional importance is recognized by the 
sovereign People.  But one can say all of this without ever once 
using the word “sovereignty” to refer to the powers of 
government, as against those appertaining to the pouvoir 
constituent. 
I have been teaching McCulloch now for some forty years.  
I once thought I truly understood what Marshall was saying.  But 
now I find myself wondering.  It is not, incidentally, that I think 
there is a singular meaning awaiting us if only we can crack the 
code contained within the language that Marshall uses.  Indeed, I 
was critical several years ago of a long essay that our host, David 
Schwartz, had published that I thought had made just such an 
assertion.112  I am delighted that his really fine forthcoming book 
on the case appears to recant, not by asserting a different “one true 
meaning,” but rather by suggesting that, perhaps like the epic 
poem the opinion in some sense really is, it resists reduction to 
any one message.113  Indeed, it appears to invite various 
deconstructionist moves, insofar as one seeming assertion, such 
as the ontological status of Maryland as “a sovereign State,” that 
are so clearly undercut by depriving it of the basic right to tax as 
it wishes, subject, as suggested in Federalist 32, only to political 
110. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 406-07. 
112. See generally David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1 (2015).
113. DAVID SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (forthcoming August 2019). 
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resistance, but not at all to the legalized invalidation that is the 
message contained in Part II of the decision.114 
One could make the same observations about the status of 
the national government as possessing only “limited powers.”  
Well, yes, he does say this, but then one has to confront the 
(possible) meanings of paragraph 38, not to mention the meanings 
he assigns the words “necessary and proper.”  And then there is 
paragraph 42, in which we are assured, with whatever degree of 
sincerity we might assign, that the Court will always stand ready 
to monitor merely pretextual use of what would otherwise be 
within the assigned powers. 
McCulloch helps to structure much of the basic language we 
use to analyze constitutional questions.  Unfortunately, it 
bequeathed to us a completely muddled and perhaps 
incomprehensible notion of “sovereignty” that Marshall insists on 
using, not, of course, for the first time.  Mark Killenbeck 
discusses some other uses of the term by Marshall.  In Fletcher v. 
Peck,115 for example, where the Court for the first time 
invalidated a state statute on constitutional grounds, Marshall 
observed that Georgia could have rescinded the land grants in 
question (which were procured by massive fraud and a corrupt 
state legislature) were the state “a single sovereign power.”116  
But, of course, it was not, and the attempted rescission fell victim 
to either the Contract Clause or a more “general” reading of the 
Constitution to impose limits drawn from the theory of republican 
government on the State.117  Similarly, another case, Sturges (or 
Sturgis)118 v. Crowninshield,119 decided almost at the very same 
time as McCulloch, saw Marshall invalidating the New York 
State bankruptcy law that would have discharged an antecedent 
debt.120  Although New York was “in most respects, 
sovereign,”121 that did not extend to what Marshall viewed as the 
violation of the Contract Clause by allowing a party, via a state 
bankruptcy provision, to evade complying with the contractual 
114. Id. 
115. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
116. Id. at 136. 
117. See id. at 135-37. 
118. See Mark Killenbeck, M’Culloch in Context (forthcoming 2019).
119. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
120. Id. at 208.
121. Id. at 192-93.
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obligation.122  If one takes Marshall’s language seriously, one has 
not only degrees of sovereignty, but also the continued suggestion 
that it is New York that is sovereign rather than, importantly, “We 
the People” who construct the governments within the overall 
polity and determine what powers they actually enjoy. 
One of the most serious problems faced by legal 
academicians is that we are the prisoners of the language used, for 
whatever reasons, by the Supreme Court.  With regard to the hash 
the Court has made of the term “diversity” concerning the use of 
race in governmental decisions, I have suggested that the Court 
should simply be analogized to Simon in the children’s game 
“Simon Says.”123  Even less charitably, one can perhaps view the 
Court as having taken on the role of Humpty Dumpty in the 
freedom it sometimes asserts to offer idiosyncratic definitions of 
terms that pervade important works of political and social theory 
about which the Court professes, probably all too accurately, to 
complete ignorance.  Law students are rarely given explicit 
training in the rich materials of political theory relevant to law.  
And there is no reason at all to believe that those particular 
lawyers who end up on the judiciary, including the Supreme 
Court, make up for any such deficiencies in their education, 
however otherwise talented some of them undoubtedly are. 
In fact, with regard to Marshall, one can wonder, even after 
conceding his obvious brilliance as a practicing lawyer, how deep 
his formal education was, especially when compared with 
Wilson, for example.  Reviewing a recent biography of 
Marshall,124 Judge Jed Rakoff notes that Marshall, unlike, for 
example, Jefferson, “was largely self-taught and had no more than 
one year of formal schooling.”125  Although he did enroll in the 
law curriculum at the College of William and Mary after his 
distinguished service in the Revolutionary War, “he lasted only 
six weeks before dropping out.”126  Rakoff concedes that these 
122. Id. at 208.
123. See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PENN.  J. CON. L. 573, 578 (2000),
reprinted in Sanford Levinson, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 11 (2003). 
124. Joel Richard Paul, WITHOUT PRECEDENT:  CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL 
AND HIS TIMES (2018). 
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“limited foundations” nonetheless allowed Marshall to build “a 
command of the law,” coupled with a skill in advocacy, “that 
quickly made him a leader of the Virginia Bar.”127  One can 
readily agree while, at the same time, believing that perhaps 
someone better trained would have been more careful in his 
almost casual use of the term “sovereign.”  After all, we know 
that Marshall wrote Joseph Story in 1821, only two years after 
McCulloch, that the “tendency of things” in his home state of 
Virginia “verges rapidly to the destruction of the government and 
the re-establishment of a league of sovereign states.”128 Did he 
not recognize that his own questionable use of the loaded 
language of “sovereignty” might have contributed to this 
tendency? 
Justice Kagan wrote with disarming candor in Puerto Rico 
v. Sanchez Valle,129 which deals with the status of Puerto Rico in
the context of the “dual sovereignty” theory of criminal liability
that allows punishment for the same overt acts by both state and
national levels of government, that “[t]ruth be told, however,
‘sovereignty’ in this context does not bear its ordinary
meaning . . . . In short, the inquiry (despite its label) does not 
probe whether a government possesses the usual attributes, or acts 
in the common manner, of a sovereign entity.”130  Lawyers must 
in effect forget what some of them might in fact have learned from 
the study of political theory and instead embrace the 
specialized—and confusing—language of the law, especially as 
declared by the Supreme Court.  Similarly, Justice Thomas in turn 
had undoubtedly been correct in the earlier case of United States 
v. Lara131 when describing the language used by the Court (and
therefore by legal academics in thrall to such language) to
describe the status of American Indian tribes as
“schizophrenic.”132  As he writes, “[i]t is quite arguably the
127. Id. 
128. Id.; Marshall to Story, quoted in William E. Dodd, Chief Justice Marshall and
Virginia, 1813-1821, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 777 (1904); see also Matt Steilen, A VIRGINIA 
PERSPECTIVE ON MCCULLOCH 26 (2018) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The 
Arkansas Law Review).  Incidentally, Professor Steilen took exception to my suggestion that 
Marshall might have been inadequately educated, at least with regard to the complexities of 
“sovereign” and “sovereignty.” 
129. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016)
130. Id. at 1870. 
131. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
132. Id. at 219.
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essence of sovereignty not to exist merely at the whim of an 
external government.”133  He therefore concludes by plaintively 
suggesting that “until we begin to analyze these questions 
honestly and rigorously, the confusion that I have identified will 
continue to haunt our cases.”134 
A central meta-issue is what would constitute an “honest and 
rigorous” analysis of a term like “sovereignty.”  Would it draw on 
the literature of trained political theorists (some of whom have 
suggested that the term should in fact be banished from discourse 
given the conflicting definitions proffered by different theorists) 
or treated as part of the “autonomous” language of the law, which 
need not concern itself with the professional discourses of 
others.135  One might suggest that the “haunting” alluded to by 
Justice Thomas owes a great deal to Marshall’s altogether 
confusing use of language in McCulloch and, of course, his later 
opinions in what has come to be known as the “Marshall trilogy” 
of cases dealing with the rights of American Indians, where 
Marshall wrestles with the degree to which Indian tribes that 
wish, like the American colonists vis-à-vis the British, to be 
independent, retain measures of “sovereignty” even as they have 
become “domestic dependent nations” under the power of the 
decidedly alien United States government.136  It should not be 
surprising that American Indian tribes and First Peoples of 
Canada are resistant to the desiccated notion of “sovereignty” 
133. Id. at 218.
134. Id. at 226.
135. See, in this context, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. 
Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012), where he almost contemptuously dismisses the rich 
philosophical literature on the act-omission distinction as mere “metaphysics” of no interest 
to the practicing lawyer.  His musings in the second part of the decision, dealing with the 
conditions placed upon states should they wish to continue enrollment in the existing 
Medicaid programs, pay equally little attention to the philosophical literature on the meaning 
of “coercion.”  See id. at 582-87.  One could, of course, make a similar point with regard to 
the Justices’ use of historical materials in their assertions about, say, “original meanings.” 
See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “‘Lite”‘ in Modern American Constitutionalism, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).   
136. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S 543 (1823) (legitimizing conquest of Indian
lands basically on principle that might makes legal right); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,  30 
U.S 1 (1831) (denying foreign statehood status to Cherokee Nation as a requisite to invoking
original jurisdiction between the U.S. Supreme Court to claim Georgia’s violation of
Cherokee’s protected sovereign rights); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S 515 (1832) (resisting
Georgia’s, as distinguished from the national government’s, claim to jurisdiction over
Cherokee territory).
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imposed by their conquerors.  A quite stunning collection of 
paintings by a Canadian First Nations artist, Lawrence Paul 
Yuxweluptun, collected under the title Unceded Territories, 
includes one painting entitled “Guardian Spirits on the Land:  
Ceremony of Sovereignty,” and another one, entitled “An Indian 
Game (Juggling Books” that includes references to books on 
“Indian Country” and “Nation to Nation: Aboriginal Sovereignty 
and the Future of Canada.”137 
It is a standard observation within literary theory that what 
explains the staying power of classics within the canon is that they 
are subject to multiple interpretations.  New theses can still be 
written about Hamlet or King Lear.  Are we really confident we 
know whether God or Satan is the true “hero” of Paradise Lost?  
How should we assess Starbuck’s conduct as First Mate on the 
ill-fated Pequod in relation to Ahab’s obsessive search for Moby 
Dick?  And so on.  Similarly, what accounts for the continuing 
fascination of McCulloch is that the conversation about what in 
the world it “really means” and stands for will never end, not least 
because it raises questions that are absolutely central to the project 
of the American republic but are never definitively answered 
within the four corners of the proffered opinion.  Whether this is 
a comfort, either to us or to our students to whom we “introduce” 
the case, may be another matter. 
137. See LAWRENCE PAUL YUXWELUPTUN: UNCEDED TERRITORIES 76, 81 (Karen
Duffek & Tania Willard, eds., 2016). 
